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Abstract 
This paper compares sharing (equity) and debt contracts in presence of moral hazard which 
manifests as the hidden effort undertaken by the entrepreneur. The originality of this paper 
relatively  to  the  existing  studies  consists  in  performing  the  comparison  between  the  two 
types of contracts while considering a more general context along two dimensions. The first 
dimension is enabling the internal funds of the entrepreneur to vary between 0% and a level 
just inferior to 100%.  The second dimension is the incorporation of an incentive mechanism 
to the sharing contract in the context of a two‐period relationship. I showed that the sharing 
and debt contracts are feasible when the internal funds of the entrepreneur are superior to 
determined thresholds. These thresholds depend on the characteristics of the project  (size, 
payoffs,  and  probability  of  success/failure)  and  the  opportunity  cost  of  the  financier.  The 
debt  contract  is  shown  to  be  characterized  by  larger  financial  access  than  the  sharing 
contract.    I  have  also  shown  that  the  enlargement  of  the  financial‐relationship  to  two 
periods has an incentivizing effect on the entrepreneur and enlarges the region of financial 
access  for  the  two  types  of  contracts,  if  a  common  condition  of  sufficiently  foresighted 
entrepreneur  is  satisfied.  However,  two  distinct  conditions  are  also  necessary  for  the 
enlargement of the financial access to occur. For the sharing contract, the second condition is 
related to the size of the project which should be inferior to a determined threshold. For the 
debt contract, the second condition is related to the threat of non‐renewal of the financing in 
case  of  first‐period  failure, which  should  be  sufficiently  stringent.  In  addition,  it  has  been 
shown that the more restrictive the threat of non‐renewal the larger the region of financial 
access. However,  this  is  realized  at  the expense of  the  second period  investment which 
decreases,  and  represents  the  economic  efficiency’  effect of  the debt  contract.  Finally,  I 
discussed the effect on the financial access of taxing the “risk‐free” financial operation and 
subsidizing the “higher effort” of the insufficiently‐capitalized entrepreneurs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a large literature showing that debt dominates equity contract in presence of 
information problems and costly monitoring. In Innes (1990) there is asymmetric information 
between the financier and the entrepreneur about the level of effort undertaken by the latter. 
Under the conditions of limited liability and the non-decreasing of the financier’s payoff, it is 
shown that debt dominates equity. Once, the second condition is relaxed the optimal contract 
(which leads to the higher effort) is no more debt but have the form of “live-or-die” having the 
following feature: the investor is paid a constant share of the firm profit if the latter is below a 
determined threshold, and nothing when the profit exceeds this level. The explication, of the 
optimality of debt in case of non-decreasing payoff of the investor is the following: under any 
other form of contract the entrepreneur will not get the full benefit from the additional payoffs 
generated out of higher effort, which results in an effort level that does not maximizes the 
project’s payoff. Ul Haque and Mirakhor (1987) reached similar result.  The authors consider 
a two-period model where the loanable funds arise from the saving of a representative 
consumer facing the classical utility maximization problem in two-period framework with its 
corollary trade-off between consumption and saving. The investment project is undertaken 
during the second period. The financier (consumer) is considered as risk averse facing an 
opportunity cost while the entrepreneur is risk-neutral. The authors show that in the case of 
certainty debt and equity contracts generate the same level of investment. However, in case of 
uncertainty on the project’s output - which is dependent on the level of effort undertaken by 
the entrepreneur - the results are different. Indeed, in case of symmetric information between 
the financier and the entrepreneur (specifically in case of observable level of effort undertaken 
by the latter) the level of investment is higher in case of profit sharing contract and Pareto sub-
optimality does not necessarily occur. However, in presence of moral hazard with 
unobservable effort the level of investment increases and the return to capital may be lower 
under sharing contacts.    
 
The other rationale for the dominance of debt over equity is the minimization of monitoring 
costs as it was shown by the literature on debt contract optimality with costly state verification 
(e.g. Townsend, 1979 and Gale and Hellwig, 1985).  This result is shown when monitoring 
under equity occurs systematically or what is called deterministic monitoring. Al-Suwailem 
(2005) develops a one-period model where the effort undertaken by the entrepreneur and the 
stochastic status of the demand affect the payoff of the project. In this model, the asymmetric 
information regarding the realized output of the project (which is totally financed by external 
funds) is revealed by the financier through a random auditing strategy. This strategy reduces 
the higher monitoring cost of the sharing (equity) contract.  Al-Suwailem (2005) shows that 
equity Pareto-dominates the debt contract for a determined range of the financier’s opportunity 
cost. The range of this Pareto dominance increases with the project’s probability of success as 
well as with the bankruptcy cost. Khan (1987) considers debt and equity contracts in a one-
period model and analyzes their Pareto optimality by comparing the expected payoff they 
generate for the financier and the entrepreneur. In this framework, it is assumed that the 
investment projects have the same probability distribution but their returns are ex-post 
uncorrelated. The financier has a continuous utility function and cares only about its expected 
payoff (which is a less restrictive assumption than the risk neutrality) and the entrepreneurs are 
risk averse and care about their expected utility. Under symmetric information, it is shown that 
the equity contract dominates the debt contract because it generates smoother income for the 
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entrepreneur while the financier is indifferent between the two types of contracts for a given 
sharing rule.  In presence of moral hazard, Khan (1987) shows that debt contract dominates 
the equity contract for sufficiently low level of risk aversion from the side of the financier 
because it minimizes the cost of monitoring1. This trade-off between the benefits of risk-
smoothing under equity contracts and the incentive effects of debt contracts has been also 
shown in Jensen and Mackling (1976), Grossman and Hart (1982) in presence of moral 
hazard. Trester (1998) develops a four-period model trying to explain why venture capitalists 
use equity rather than debt to finance entrepreneurial projects. The author considers a 
framework where information is initially symmetric between the risk-neutral entrepreneur and 
the venture capitalist. However, subsequently asymmetric information about the payoff of the 
project arises with a non-null probability which is the case when the entrepreneur learns the 
status of the project one period before the venture capitalist. In this case, it is shown that debt 
contract may be infeasible and leads to the use of preferred equity contracts. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the foreclosure option of the debt contract may incentivize the entrepreneur 
to behave opportunistically which reduces the expected return of the venture capitalist.  
 
The objective of this paper is to compare equity and debt contracts in presence of moral hazard 
which manifests as the hidden effort undertaken by the entrepreneur. The originality of this 
paper relatively to the existing studies consists in performing the comparison between the two 
types of contracts while considering a more general context along two dimensions. The first 
dimension is enabling the internal funds provided by the entrepreneur to vary between null 
(which corresponds to Innes, 1990 and the other above mentioned studies) and a level just 
inferior to 100%.  The justification of considering this more general dimension is the intuition 
that the opportunistic behavior of the entrepreneur is less likely to happen when his own 
investment is higher. The second dimension is the incorporation of an incentive mechanism to 
the equity contract in the context of a two-period relationship. The incentive mechanism is 
related to the fact that the entrepreneur’s (financier’) share in the project’s payoff is increasing 
(decreasing) with the internal funds. Therefore, in the context of a two-period relationship the 
entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort during the first period is even much important since 
he is not only concerned by the cash-flow generated at the end of the first-period, but also by 
increasing his share in the second period production cycle. The higher the cash-flow generated 
in the first period, the higher its share during the second period.  
 
In our model the payoff is observable by the financier without any cost. Besides, the financier 
and the entrepreneur are risk-neutral. Therefore, an eventual optimality of equity contract 
relatively to debt will not rest on the existence of random auditing strategy or the smoothing of 
the uncertain payoffs as it is the case under risk aversion contracting parties.  The optimality 
of equity is rather explored in relation to the reduction of economic inefficiency which 
emerges under debt contract in the context of two-period relationship.  
 
This economic inefficiency is shown in Dang (2010) who considers two-period debt based 
relationship between risk-neutral entrepreneur and financier. The entrepreneur has no internal 
                                                 
1 The model of Khan (1987) is a demand side model which assumes a fixed supply of loanable funds. In this 
framework, the financier plays a neutral role, and the Pareto Optimality is determined by the preferences of the 
entrepreneur. Indeed, the author shows that it is always possible to find a sharing rule that makes the financier 
indifferent between the two types of contracts. This is not realistic since the financier may have an alternative to 
invest his funds in a secure investment which generate a safe return. In that case, the sharing rule will be 
constrained by the best alternative opportunity or the opportunity cost of financing the investment projects.   
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funds and needs a fixed amount of funds to undertake a risky project. The probability of 
success and failure is dependent on the level of the undertaken effort. Dang (2010) includes 
two incentivizing tools in the entrepreneur-financier financial contracting. The first incentive 
is the classical characteristic of the one-period debt contract which consists in making the 
profits of the entrepreneur non-decreasing in the project’s profits2.  The second incentive for 
higher effort is the termination threat which consists in the nonrenewal of project financing 
during the second period in case of failure during the first period.3 It is clear that this second 
incentivizing tool penalizes the entrepreneur who undertakes higher effort but whose project 
failed due to bad luck (realization of the low productivity in the case of high effort). This is 
clearly a source of economic inefficiency. Dang (2010) argues that this means that an 
entrepreneur with an investment project having a positive net present value will not be 
financed during the second period because his first-period project failed.  
 
The two-period debt contract identified in this paper has similar features than that considered 
in Dang (2010) at the exception that I consider a more general context enabling for the internal 
funds of the entrepreneur and for the reinvesting of the first-period cash flows. Intuitively, our 
suggested equity contract will dominate the debt contract in respect to the above mentioned 
economic efficiency dimension. However, the feasibility of such contract is constrained by the 
opportunity cost of the lender who might not be able to obtain the expected rate of return 
otherwise possible under the debt contract. Therefore, another dimension is taken in 
consideration in our model which is the financial access to external funds by the entrepreneurs 
according to their available internal resources. I show that the sharing and debt contracts are 
feasible when the internal funds of the entrepreneur are superior to determined thresholds. 
These thresholds depend on the characteristics of the project (size, payoffs, and probability of 
success/failure) and the opportunity cost of the financier. The debt contract is shown to be 
characterized by larger financial access than the sharing contract. I have also shown that the 
enlargement of the financial-relationship to two periods has an incentivizing effect on the 
entrepreneur and enlarges the region of financial access for the two types of contracts, if a 
common condition of sufficiently foresighted entrepreneur is satisfied. However, two distinct 
conditions are also necessary for the enlargement of the financial access to occur. For the 
sharing contract, the second condition is related to the size of the project which should be 
inferior to a determined threshold. For the debt contract, the second condition is related to the 
threat of non-renewal of the financing in case of first-period failure, which should be 
sufficiently stringent. In addition, it has been shown that the more restrictive the threat of non-
renewal the larger the region of financial access. However, this is realized at the expense of 
the second period investment which decreases and represents the economic efficiency’ effect 
of the debt contract. In the policy recommendation section, I discuss the ability of taxing the 
                                                 
2 Like in Innes (1990) this provides incentives to the entrepreneur to exert high effort to increase the probability 
of high profits. In the context of the two-state world considered by Dang (2010), increasing the probability of 
higher profit is not else than decreasing the probability of failure. Therefore, the probability of failure is 
negatively correlated with the level of undertaken effort. 
3 The role of the nonrenewal of project financing has been also analyzed in the literature about venture capital 
and monitoring. Sahlman (1990) notes that staged financing is an important tool for venture capitalists to 
minimize agency costs. Hellmann (1994) shows that, in case of higher uncertainty at the beginning of the project, 
a venture capitalist provides "staged" finance with the option to terminate a project at interim stages instead of 
long-term finance. Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) show that the optimal contract in a "venture capitalist"-
"entrepreneur" relationship is a fixed-fraction contract whereby the former receives a fixed fraction of the 
project's payoff and provides financing for that same fraction for future investments. 
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“risk-free” financial operation and subsidizing the “higher effort” of the insufficiently-
capitalized entrepreneurs on the enlargement of the financial access.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. 
Section 3 characterizes the profit sharing and debt contracts in the context of a one-period 
relationship. Section 4 characterizes the two types of contracts in the context of a two-period 
relationship. Section 5 provides numerical examples that illustrate the theoretical results and 
explore the differences of two types of financial contracts. In section 6, I discuss some policy 
implications of the model. An extension of the model is suggested in section 7. Finally, section 
8 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
 
 
I study the contracting relationship between risk-neutral financier and entrepreneur in presence 
of moral hazard due to the inability of the principal to observe the effort undertaken by the 
agent after the signature of the financial contract. The entrepreneur is endowed with internal 
funds but needs complementary external funding to undertake the investment project. In 
section 3, I study the relationship in the context of one-period whereas a two-period 
relationship is considered in section 4.  
 
2.1 Economic environment 
 
 
A risk-neutral entrepreneur operates a firm which generates a stochastic output: a high 
level and a low level . The probability e of realization of the high output depends on the 
effort level e  undertaken by the entrepreneur. This effort is private information of the 
entrepreneur and cannot be observed by the risk-neutral financier.  However, the latter can 
observe perfectly the output of the firm. The relationship between the entrepreneur and the 
financier is analyzed in the context of  sharing (equity) and debt contracts.  
 
2.2 Entrepreneur 
 
A risk-neutral entrepreneur is endowed with a technology that produces a stochastic output 
according to the following distribution 
  with a probability of 
  with a probability of 1
e
e
   
  
 (1) 
where   and   represent respectively the high level and low level of output respectively 
verifying 0  <  . The probability e  is depending on the level of effort 
 ,e h l undertaken by the entrepreneur such that the realization of the higher profit is more 
likely when the high level of effort h  takes place: 1 0h l    . The disutility of the effort is 
captured through the costs hc  and lc  verifying 0h lc c  which means that the higher the 
effort the higher the cost for the entrepreneur. The investment funds needed to operate the firm 
are represented by F . The entrepreneur is initially endowed with an amount  0,f F  which 
means that he needs complementary external funds of F f in order to operate the firm. We 
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denote by  0 /x F f F   the share of capital provided by the financier. The remainder share 
provided by the entrepreneur is therefore 01 x . We assume that the expected output of the 
firm is superior to the investment F only in case of higher effort: 
 
 +(1 )
 +(1 )
h
h h
l
l l
E F
E F


   
   
  
    (2)
 
Since the entrepreneur is assumed to be risk-neutral he increases his utility by maximizing his 
end of period output after payment of the financier’s share and supporting the cost of effort. 
 
Assumption1. If the entrepreneur could self-finance the firm then he would chose the higher 
level of effort. This is equivalent to the following condition 
  h l h l h lE E c c            (3)
which signifies that the additional expected revenue resulting from the higher effort exceeds 
the additional cost.  
 
2.3 Financier 
 
A risk-neutral financier requires an expected rate of return equal to 0 1   which is the 
available return on risk-free financial operation. Therefore, the expected payoff of the 
financier, generated from the investment project, should be equal to 0(1 )x F . While the 
financier cannot observe the entrepreneur’s effort, he observes without cost the firm’s output 
and can infer the entrepreneur’s effort choice from the latter’s utility maximization problem.  
 
 
Assumption2. The expected return of the investment project is higher than the risk-free return 
if and only if the higher level of effort is undertaken, i.e.: 
1
l hE E
F F
     (4) 
3. Financial contracts in a one-period relationship 
 
3.1 Sharing contracts 
 
 
I consider a one-period relationship which begins at date  0t   and finishes at date  1t  .             
The entrepreneur and the financier agree on a partnership contract 0 0( , , )x F x   whereby 
the entrepreneur commits to undertake the high level of effort ( )e h and invests an amount 
 01f x F  whereas the financier finances the firm by providing an amount 0F f x F  . 
The contract stipulates also that the financier receives a share  ( 0x  ) of the output and the 
entrepreneur receives a share is 1   (1 )  in case of success (failure) of the project. We are 
looking for a sharing contract such that   which means that the financier’s share in case 
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of success is lower than its share in case of failure of the project4. Given this specification, it is 
clear that in case of failure of the project (realization of the low level of the output ) the 
financier (entrepreneur) receives a share 0x  ( 01 x ) equal to its initial participation to the 
capital. For the sharing contract to be fully characterized we need to determine the share .  
 
3.1.1. Symmetric information 
 
 
In case of symmetric information, the financier observes the effort of the entrepreneur who 
cannot deviate from its contractual engagement to undertake the high level of effort. In this 
case, the share * that procures the financier an expected rate of return of  is given by: 
* *
0E(W *)  +(1- ) (1 )
inv
h h x F          (5) 
Or equivalently  
 
 
*
0 0
0
*
0
1
( ) [1 ]
           1 (1 )
             
h
h
h
h
E F
x x
x F
x
   
   

  
     
 
 
(6) 
This expression shows that if the high expected return /hE F  of the project equals the risk-
free return 1   then * * 0x   . Otherwise, if the high expected return exceeds the risk-free 
return then the financier accepts a lower share * *   in case of success of the project. It is 
also clear that the share *  in case of success (realization of the high output ) increases with 
the amount of the external financing 0x F . It also increases with the risk-free rate of return  . 
However, the share of the financier decreases when the project become safer. Indeed, it 
decreases with hE , the higher expected return of the project as well as with h , the probability 
of success  in case of high effort. The entrepreneur utility is given by  
 
   * *E(W *) 1  +(1- ) 1ent h h hc          (7) 
 
                                                 
4 From the Islamic Finance perspective, the practice of incentivizing the agent in case of Mudharabah (sharing 
contract with no internal funds from the part of the agent) by increasing his share in the payoffs in case of success 
of the project, has been approved in the 2nd Islamic Finance Conference in Kuwait and the fourth Sharia opinion 
of the 1st Al-Barakah Conference. For the Musharakah contract (sharing with financial participation from the 
principal and the agent) it is known that the sharing of the losses should be proportional to the capital 
participation of each party but the sharing of the profits could be different according to an initial agreement.  Our 
sharing contract satisfies these criteria. Indeed,  in case of failure of the project, the loss F   is supported by the 
financier at the extent of 0 0x x F  and by the entrepreneur at the extent of (1 ) (1 )0 0x x F   . Let’s note that if the 
partnership contract is such that all the investment is provided by the financier ( 10x  ) than the latter endures the 
entire loss in case of failure of the project.  
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3.1.2. Asymmetric information 
 
Assume that the financier offers to the entrepreneur the contract *0( , , )x F   but the 
entrepreneur deviates from its commitment to undertake the higher effort (e h ) and performs 
the lower effort  e l . In case of asymmetric information, this deviation is not observable by 
the financier and could not be inferred from the observation of the output. Indeed, the lower 
output    could occur even in the case of higher effort with a probability1 h . Undertaking 
the lower effort just increases the probability of failure from 1 h  to1 l .  
 
 
Assumption 4. If the entrepreneur is indifferent between the lower and higher effort then he 
will fulfills his commitment and will undertake the higher effort  e h . 
 
Let’s now analyze in which case the deviation of the entrepreneur could occur. 
 
Lemma 1. The entrepreneur has an incentive to undertake the higher effort  e l  if his 
capital participation in the firm 0(1 )x  exceeds (1 )x where x is given by 
        1 ( )
h lE E c ch lx x h F h l
     
  
    
 (8) 
Proof. See the appendix. 
 
This lemma signifies that the additional cost of effort borne by the entrepreneur ( h lc c ) is 
lower than his additional expected revenues if he invests at least (1 )x F . Otherwise, 
(i.e. 01 1x x   ) the sharing contract *0( , , )x F    is not an incentive-compatible contract 
since the entrepreneur will be incited to shirk and undertake the lower effort  e l . Figure 1 
shows that the sharing contract is not feasible in case of total external financing of the project 
0( 1)x  which is coherent with the result shown in Innes (1990). However, I show that the 
sharing contract is feasible when the internal funds of the entrepreneur are sufficiently 
higher1 1x x   . 
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Figure 1. Additional benefit and cost resulting from undertaking higher effort‐ Case of sharing contract 
 
Figure 1 illustrates also that differentiating the financier’s share by fixing a lower share in case 
of success enlarges the region of feasibility of the sharing contract. The justification of this 
result rests naturally on the additional incentive to the entrepreneurs endowed with insufficient 
internal resources to undertake the higher effort.  
 
Proposition 1.  
 
i) If 0x x  then the equity contract *0( , , )x F   provides the financier with an expected rate of 
return of  .  
ii) If 0x x  then 
   ii-1) Under the equity contract *0( , , )x F   the entrepreneur chooses the lower  effort and 
the financier’s expected  rate of return is .   
ii-2) If 0 ˆmax( , )x x x x   then the equity contract which provides the financier with an 
expected rate of return  is  0 ˆ( , , )x F   where ˆ verifies  
 * *
0
1ˆ 1
l
F
x
    
       
 (9) 
 ˆ 1llx F
 
      (10) 
0x  
  h l
h lE E
    
 
 
0  1  
Additional cost 
c ch l  
*( )x    
01 x  
1  1 x  0  
   (1 )h l h
h
E F  

    
Additional benefit 
  * *(1 ) (1 )h l            
Innes (1990) 
 
*   
*   
*( )x    
*1 ( )x     
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 *
0
h l
x F
          

 
(11) 
Proof. See the appendix. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 presents the possible payoffs of the financier under the two equity contracts. The 
payoff of the entrepreneur could be derived geometrically as the difference between the 45o 
line and the payoff of the financier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Payoff of the financier according to the three feasible sharing contracts 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the different regions presented in proposition 1 under the condition that the 
financier requires an expected rate of return of  . In the region  0, x  the entrepreneur does 
not require large external financing and has an incentive to undertake the higher effort. In this 
case, the share of the financier is * . However, for 0x x  the amount of entrepreneur’s 
financing is not enough higher and the entrepreneur has an incentive to shirk and undertakes 
the lower effort. 
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      Figure 3. Feasibility and characteristics of the equity contract according to the external financing needs 
 
 
For this reason, the financier offers in the region  ˆ,max( , )x x x  the contract 
0 ˆ( , , )x F   whereby he requires a higher share ( *ˆ  ) of the payoff in case of success of the 
project. This result is intuitive since in order for the financier to keep constant its expected 
return at  he has to overcome the decreasing of the probability of success (from h
 
to l ) by 
increasing its share in the outcome from *  toˆ . In the region  ˆmax( , ),1x x  the external 
financing required by the entrepreneur is extremely higher so that no equity contract is feasible 
due to the inability of the financier to incentivize the entrepreneur to undertake the higher 
effort, or to increase its share to the level that generates an expected return equal to the risk-
free rate of return. 
 
3.2 Debt contract 
 
Let’s know consider that the financier signs with the entrepreneur a debt contract 
0 0( , min( , ))x F x FZ   whereby the financier provides a financing 0x F  at a gross rate of interest 
equal to 1Z  . At the end of the period, if the payoff of the firm   is superior to the sum of 
the principal and interest 0( )x FZ  then the financier receives a fixed payment of 0x FZ  and the 
entrepreneur’s payoff equals 0x FZ  . Otherwise, the financier recuperates the entire 
output . It is clear that we have to ensure that 0x FZ   in order for the financier to be 
reimbursed (the principal and interest)  in case of success of the project (  ). If 0x FZ   
then the financier receives 0x FZ  with certitude even in case of failure of the project. In the 
case 0x FZ    the payment received by the financier is given by: 
1
0x  
0xˆ 0  x
No contract  0 ˆ( , , )x F   *0( , , )x F    
ˆ If x x  
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0x  
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ˆ If x x  
x
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      00
  with a probability of 
W min( , )
        with a probability of 1-
einv
e
x FZ
x FZ
  
  
 (12)
 
and the cash-flow which remains for the entrepreneur is the following: 
 
      00
  with a probability of 
min( , )
0               with a probability of 1-
e
e
x FZ
x FZ
   
  
 (13)
 
Figure 4 illustrates the “classical” payoff of the financier under the debt contract with specific 
annotation of the two-state output of the project in our model. It is clear that the financier 
recuperates all the output in case of failure of the project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Payoff of the financier under the debt contract 
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Proposition 2. The feasibility and characteristics of the debt contract depend on the amount 
of external financing as follows: 
 
 If  0 0, / (1 )x F    the contract is 0 0( , (1 ) )x F x F . 
 If '0 / (1 ) ,min( , )h lx F x x      the contract is 0 0( , )hx F Z x F . 
 If ' '0 min( , ),h l lx x x x   the contract is 0 0( , )lx F Z x F . 
 If ' '0 ,max( , )l h lx x x x   the contract is 0 0( , )hx F Z x F . 
 If '0 max( , ),1h lx x x   there is no feasible debt contract. 
 
with  
(1 )  < h lZ Z   (14) 
 
The expressions of ',  , l l hx x x  and h lZ Z  which depend on the characteristics of the project, 
the risk-free rate of return and the marginal cost of high effort, are given in the appendix.  
 
Proof. See the appendix. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the different regions presented in proposition 2. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                
 
                                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                
 
                                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Feasibility and characteristics of the debt contract for different levels of the external financing needs 
 
In the region  0, / (1 )F   the principal and interests of the loan borrowed by the 
entrepreneur could be reimbursed with certainty whatever the outcome of the project. For this 
reason the gross interest rate is equal to the risk-free gross rate of return (1 ) . However, for 
0 / (1 )x F    the entrepreneur defaults on the loan in case of failure of the project. 
Therefore, the financier provides the entrepreneur with the required financing in the region 
1 
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 / (1 ) , hF x   at a higher gross interest rate >(1 )hZ 
 
and it is shown that, in this region 
the entrepreneur has an incentive to undertake the higher effort. However, when the internal 
resources are sufficiently low (or equivalently the externally required financing is sufficiently 
high hx x ) the entrepreneur has an incentive to shirk and undertakes the lower effort.           
For this reason the gross interest rate in the region ',h lx x    increases to > >(1 )l hZ Z   when 
'
h lx x  and the debt contract is not feasible in the region 'max( , ),1h lx x   . 
4. Financial contracts in a two-period relationship 
 
 
The characteristics of the firm are identical to those described in section 2. I consider an 
entrepreneur who is initially (  0t  ) endowed with an amount of capital equal 
to  01f x F  .  At the beginning of the second period the entrepreneur will reinvest any 
cash-flow  11 x F  generated from the first-period project in the new project. It is 
particularly interesting to analyze if the larger horizon of the relationship, relatively to the one-
period horizon considered in section 3,  will incentivize the entrepreneur to undertake the 
higher effort and consequently if it enables the enlargement of the region of external financial 
access. Indeed, if the initial amount  01f x F   of capital endowment of the entrepreneur 
verifies  
 0 ˆmax( , ),1x x x  (15) 
'
0 max( , ),1h lx x x   (16) 
 
then according to the results of section 2 the entrepreneur could not benefit from external 
funding in the context of a one-period relationship and therefore he could not undertake his 
project. I will analyze which type of financing contract (sharing or debt) enables the access to 
finance with lower constraint in regards to the initial funding and which contract will succeed 
to incentivize the undertaking of higher effort.  
 
4.1 Sharing contract 
 
 
The partnership between the financier and the entrepreneur covers now two periods. At the 
initial date  0t   the two parties agree on two separate partnership contracts. At the beginning 
of the first period (  0t  ) the entrepreneur and the financier agree on a partnership contract 
0 1 1 0( , , )x F x  
 whereby the entrepreneur commits to undertake the high level of effort 
( )e h and participates with an amount of capital of  01f x F  whereas the financier 
finances the firm by providing an amount 0F f x F  . The entrepreneur commits to reinvest 
his share of the payoff during the second period so that the second partnership contract 
becomes 1 2 2 1( , , )x F x  
  where  
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    
1
1
1
1     with prob 
1
1     with prob 1-
e
e
x F
  
  
   

  (17) 
 
Condition (17) states that the self-financed capital of the entrepreneur during the second 
period arises from the payoff he receives at the end of the first period. We have also to ensure 
that even in the case the entrepreneur is incentivized to undertake the higher effort, the 
expected wealth of the financier in each period is equal to wealth he would obtain if he invests 
his capital in a risk-free asset. Therefore, the following conditions should hold: 
 
1 1 1 0E(W )  +(1 ) (1 )
inv
h h x F         
   (18) 
2 2 2 1E(W )  +(1- ) (1 )
inv
h h x F        
   (19) 
 
Therefore, we obtain the shares that characterize the two partnership contracts are given by 
*
1 0( )x   (20) 
*
2 1( )x   (21) 
Where * 0( )x  is given by (6). Let’s note that at date  0t   the share 2  that characterizes the 
second-period partnership contract is not fully determined. Only its variation with the payoff 
 11 x F  according to (21) and (6) is known. Using (21), (17) and (6) we obtain the ex-ante 
(at  0t  ) expression of the share 2 1( )e e  which depends on the state of the nature that takes 
place at  1t   and the effort undertaken by the entrepreneur during the first period: 
 
   
   
1
2
2 1
0
2
1
(1 ) (1 )     with prob 
( )
1
(1 ) (1 )    with prob 1-
up
h e
h
down
h e
h
F
F
F
e e
F x
F
F
            
             



 (22) 
Given that the share 2 is decreasing with the payoff  (  or )   that takes place during the first 
period, it is possible that the entrepreneur will be incentivized to undertake the higher effort 
during the first period in order to maximize its second period payoff. Therefore, the decision 
of the entrepreneur should be analyzed by considering its expected inter-temporal discounted 
wealth 
11 2 2 1 2
( , ) ( , )ent enteEW e e c EW e e   (23) 
where 1   is the entrepreneur’s discount factor. Equation (23) shows that the effort 
 1 ,e l h  undertaken by the entrepreneur requires a cost 1ec  and affects the expected wealth 
2 1 2( , )
entEW e e  during the second period since it impacts the probabilities of success and failure 
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of the project and therefore the revenues that will be reinvested during the second period and 
consequently the probability that his share in the second’s period project equals 2 2 or 
up down   .  
 
Proposition3. The partnership over two periods enlarges the region of financial access to 
 0 ˆmax( , ),x x x x   and incentivizes the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort 
1 2( , )e h e h   if the latter is sufficiently foresighted and the size of the project inferior to a 
determined threshold: 
 
              If  
     If   max( , )
ˆ
F F
x x
F F F F
x x

 
      

  
 
where the thresholds , , ,  and x x F F   are defined in the appendix. 
 
 
Proof. See the appendix. 
 
This result is intuitive signaling that if the entrepreneur does not put sufficient importance on 
the payoffs that he will obtain during the second period, then no additional incentive will 
result from the larger horizon of the relationship financier/entrepreneur. Meanwhile, even if 
the entrepreneur is sufficiently foresighted but the project’s size exceeds max( , )F F then the 
financier will not provide financing for the projects that are not financially feasible over a one-
period relationship.  
 
4.2. Debt Contract 
 
 
The debt contract is characterized by an incentive mechanism which has been extensively 
analyzed in the financial contracting literature (see for example, Innes, 1990). Under this 
mechanism the payoff of the entrepreneur after repayment of the debt is increasing in the firm 
output. Indeed, in case of success of the project, the entrepreneur gets the full benefit from the 
additional payoffs generated out of higher effort. As a consequence, the entrepreneur has an 
incentive to maximize his expected output by undertaking the higher effort. However, I 
showed in Proposition 2 that there is no feasible debt contract in the region] 'max( , ),1h lx x ] 
signifying that this incentive mechanism is inefficient in preventing the entrepreneur from 
undertaking the low level of effort when his contribution is too low. This is particularly the 
case when the marginal cost of higher effort exceeds a determined threshold. In this section I 
consider the relationship between the financier and the entrepreneur in the context of two 
periods.  I endow the debt contract with a second incentive mechanism which has been 
suggested by Dang (2010)5 and consists in incorporating the threat of non-renewal of the 
financing during the second period in case of first-period’s failure of the project. At the initial 
date  0t  , the two parties agree on the debt contract 0 0 1( , min( , ))x F x FZ  which covers the 
                                                 
5 This has been suggested in a different two-period horizon where the entrepreneur has no initial endowment and 
is not enabled to reinvest his first-period residual cash-flow. 
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first period. In case of success of the project at the end of the first period, the financier renews 
financing the project during the second period with certainty. Otherwise (i.e. in case of failure 
of the project) the financier renews the financing with probability 0 1p  . Therefore, the 
second debt contract is 1 1 2( , , min( , ))p x F x FZ   where 1(1 )x F  represents the self-financing 
of the entrepreneur financed with the first-period payoff and given by: 
      1 0 1(1 )x F x FZ    (24) 
The objective is to analyze in which case the new form of relationship incentivizes the 
entrepreneur to undertake the high level of effort during the first period and enlarges the 
region of financial access. 
 
Proposition4.  
 
The debt contract relationship over two periods enlarges the region of financial access to 
'
0 max( , ), ( )h lx x x x     and incentivizes the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort if the 
threat of non-renewal of the financing in case of failure is sufficiently probable, i.e.: 
      1 1  p p    (25) 
Where ( )x   and   p are given in the appendix in (A39) and (A43) and verify the following 
relationships:  
      
( , ) ( , )
0 ; 0
x p x p
p
 

     (26) 
0 ; 0
( )h l
p p
c c 
      (27) 
Proof. See the appendix. 
 
From expression (26) it is clear that the likely is the threat of non-renewal of the financing 
(lower p ) the larger is the region of financial access. This means that there is a trade-off 
between increasing the region of financial access and ensuring the renewal of the financial 
relationship during the second period. However, expressions (27) reveal that this trade-off 
could be mitigated by making the threat of non-renewal less stringent for example by lowering 
the additional cost of higher effort or trying to increase the entrepreneur’s foresightedness.  
 
5. Comparison between the debt and sharing contracts 
 
5.1. Economic inefficiency  
 
I showed in proposition 4 that endowing the debt contract with the threat of non-renewal of the 
financing in case of failure is a necessary incentivizing mechanism. This generates an 
economic inefficient because even projects with positive net present value will be liquidated in 
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case of failure at the end of the first period. In other words, there will be liquidation of a 
proportion of projects that failed because of the realization of the bad state of the nature, 
although the entrepreneur undertook the high level of effort in the first period and is willing to 
undertake similarly the high level of effort in the second period. In order to compare the level 
of this economic inefficiency let’s consider that the economy comprises a continuum of 
entrepreneurs of mass 1 situated uniformly along the interval [0,1]. Each entrepreneur 
 0,1i is initially endowed with an amount of capital equals to 0(1 )i if x F  . In order to 
simplify the presentation let’s assume that 0
ix  “equals” the index of the entrepreneur i  which 
is equivalent to say that the entrepreneurs are ordered on 0,1 increasingly with their needs of 
external financing. In order to determine the economic inefficiency of debt relatively to the 
sharing contracts let’s consider the region where the two types of contracts are feasible 
without furthers conditions on the foresightedness of the entrepreneurs i.e.  
  '0 ˆ0,max( , ) 0,max( , )i h lx x x x x     or equivalently  0 min0,ix x  
where 'min ˆmin{max( , ), max( , )}h lx x x x x .  In the presence of the above mentioned incentive, 
the entrepreneur undertakes the higher effort during the first period to increase the probability 
of success of its project which equals h . Since the risks of the projects are identical and 
independent, according to the law of large numbers the proportion of successful projects in the 
region  min0, x  is h  and the failing projects represent a proportion of1 h . Besides, let’s 
recall that the financier offering a debt financial contract renews the financing of the 
successful projects with certainty and but refinances the failing projects only with 
probability p . Therefore, among the proportion 1 h  of the failing projects only a proportion 
p  will be refinanced. Hence, the total investment during the second period in this case 
is   2 min1d h hI p x F    . Whereas, total investment under the sharing contract is given 
by 2 min
shI x F  since all the projects even those having failed during the first period will be 
refinanced. Therefore, the economic inefficiency of the debt contract could be defined as the 
percentage of decrease in the investment relatively to the alternative sharing financing 
relationship:  
      2 2
2
100 (1 )(1 ) 100
d sh
inv
hsh
I I p
I
       (28) 
Expression (28) shows clearly that the economic inefficiency of the debt contract is increasing 
with the stringency of the threat of non-renewal of the financial relationship which is captured 
by (1 )p . For example, if the probability of success is 0.8h   and the probability of 
refinancing in case of failure is 0.3p    then the economic inefficiency of debt relatively to 
the sharing contract equals 14%. If we calculate the economic inefficiency of debt contract in 
term of the second-period output loss we obtain the following expression: 
      (1 )
h
out inv invE
F
       (29) 
Where the equality in (29) is derived from the relationship between investment and expected 
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payoff6 and the inequality obtained using (4). Therefore, for a risk-free rate of return equal to 
10% the economic inefficiency in term of output loss becomes 15.4%.  
 
5.2. Access to finance   
 
I showed in proposition 1 and 2 that both the sharing and debt contract are feasible when the 
internal funds (provided by the entrepreneur) are superior to determined thresholds (see also 
figure 3). These thresholds depend on the characteristics of the project (size, payoffs, and 
probability of success/failure) and the opportunity cost of the financier. In this section, I 
generate numerical simulations to compare the two contracts in terms of financial access.  
 
5.2.1. Effect of the variation of the probability of success  
 
I consider a project of size F =200 which generate a high payoff 1.98F  in case of success 
and low payoff 0.22F  in case of failure. The probability of success in case of low effort is 
0.46l   and I vary the probability of success in case of high effort as follows  0.55;1h  .              
I consider that the risk-free rate of return is 5%   and the discount factor of the entrepreneur 
is 0.95  .  Moreover,  the cost of low effort is 0.1( )h llc E E     whereas the cost of high 
effort is 0.4( )h lhc E E   which ensures that condition (3) is satisfied. In addition to the 
variation of the probability of success h  in case of high effort I also vary the proportion 0x of 
external financing needs in the range  0.1%,100% . The following table summarizes the 
different values of the parameters while figures 6.a, 6.b, 7.a and 7.b illustrate the results of the 
simulations.   
 
5%    200F    0.22F  0.1( )h llc E E      0.55;1h   
0.95    0.46l    1.98F  0.4( )h lhc E E    0 0.1%,100%x   
 
                                                 
6 The expected payoff (output) of one project in case of higher effort undertaken by the entrepreneur and which is 
obtained from an investment F is given by equation (2) :  +(1 )hE Fh h       . Therefore, the output in case of a 
proportion   of independent projects is given by   + (1 )h h hy E          while the total investment is I F . 
Therefore, the relationship between output and investment is given by   + (1 ) hh h Ey IF       . 
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Figure 6.a. Effort,  financial access and  the probability of 
success in case of profit sharing contract and 
one‐period relationship. 
Figure  6.b.  Effort,  financial  access  and  the  probability  of 
success  in  case  of  debt  contract  and  one‐period 
relationship.
Figure  7.a.  Effect  of  the  external  financing  and  the 
probability  of  success  on  the  share  ratio  of 
the financier in case of profit sharing contract 
and one‐period relationship. 
Figure  7.b.  Effect  of  the  external  financing  and  the 
probability of  success on  the  interest  rate  (Z‐1)  in case of 
debt contract and one‐period relationship. 
 
Figure 6.a and 6.b show that the debt contract is characterized by larger financial access than 
the profit sharing contract. More precisely the profit sharing contract is not feasible when the 
external financial needs are superior to 45% of the cost of the project and the probability of 
success in case of higher effort is inferior to 0.8. Therefore, the debt contract is more suitable 
for project with relatively higher risk and low internal funding. The two figures show also that, 
for the two types of contract, the higher effort is undertaken by the entrepreneur only for 
sufficiently level of the higher probability of success. This threshold is itself increasing with 
the external financing need which means that higher external needs may induce the 
entrepreneur to choose the lower effort whereas for the same type of projects another 
entrepreneur with higher internal funds chooses the higher effort.  Figure 7.a. and 7.b. present 
the profit sharing ratio   and the interest rate Z .  
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Figure  8.a.  Effort,  financial  access  and  the  probability  of 
success  in  case of profit  sharing  contracts and 
two‐period relationship. 
Figure 8.b. Effort,  financial access and  the probability of 
success  in  case  of  debt  contracts  and  two‐period 
relationship, and a probability  0.p   
Figure  9.a.  Effect  of  the  external  financing  and  the 
probability of success on the share ratio of the 
financier  in case of profit  sharing contract and 
two‐period relationship. 
Figure  9.b.  Effect  of  the  external  financing  and  the 
probability of success on the interest rate (Z‐1) in case of 
debt  contract  and  two‐period  relationship,  and  a 
probability  0.p   
 
Figure 8.a and 8.b show that the relationship between the financier and the entrepreneur over 
two periods enlarges the region of feasibility of the two contracts and reduces the gap between 
the profit sharing and the debt contract although the latter continues to be characterized by 
wider financial access. However, let’s note that the simulation was done with a probability 
1 1p   which signifies that an entrepreneur whose project failed during the first period will 
have no chance to access to external financing under the debt contracting relationship. 
According to Proposition 4 this corresponds to the larger possible region of financial access 
under the debt contract. Therefore, the gap in terms of financial access between the sharing 
and the debt contract will be lower for any other debt contract. It is also interesting to note that 
this longer relationship horizon induces the entrepreneur to choose the higher effort. Figure 9.a 
and 9.b show that the financing costs of the two financial contracts are reduced mainly due to 
the possibility of the contracts to incentivize the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort.  
 
 5.2.2. Effect of the variation of the risk-free return  
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I consider a project of size F =3000 which generate a high payoff 2.09F  in case of success 
and low payoff 0.001F  in case of failure. The probability of success in case of low effort 
is 0.45l   and the probability of success in case of high effort is 0.8h  . I vary the risk-free 
rate of return   in the interval 1%;30% . The discount factor of the entrepreneur is 0.95  . 
Moreover,  the cost of low effort is 0.1( )h llc E E     whereas the cost of high effort is 
0.8( )h lhc E E   which ensures that condition (3) is satisfied. In addition to the variation of 
the risk-free rate of return  , I also vary the proportion 0x of external financing needs in the 
range  0.1%,100% . The following table summarizes the different values of the parameters 
while figures 10.a, 10.b, 11.a and 11.b illustrate the results of the simulations.   
 
 
3000F    0.45l    0.001F  0.1( )h llc E E      1%;30%   
0.95    0.8h    2.09F    0.8( )h lhc E E      0 0.1%,100%x   
 
Figure  10.a.  Effort,  financial  access  and  the  risk‐free  return  in 
case  of  profit  sharing  contract  and  one‐period 
relationship. 
Figure  10.b.  Effort,  financial  access  and  the  risk‐free 
return  in  case  of  debt  contract  and  one‐period 
relationship.
 
Again, figure 10.a and 10.b show that the debt contract is characterized by larger financial 
access than the profit sharing contract in case of one-period relationship. Indeed, the two 
contracts are not feasible when the external financial needs are superior to determined 
thresholds which are itself decreasing with the opportunity cost of the financier. However, the 
threshold of the profit sharing is inferior to that characterizing the debt contract.  
 
 22 
 
Figure  11.a.  Effort,  financial  access  and  the  risk‐free  return  in 
case  of  profit  sharing  contracts  and  two‐period 
relationship. 
Figure  11.b.  Effort,  financial  access  and  the  risk‐free 
return  in  case  of  debt  contracts  and  two‐period 
relationship with a probability  0.p   
 
Figure 11.a and 11.b confirm the results of the simulations illustrated by figures 10.a and 10.b 
which are the positive effect of the longer horizon on the incentive of the entrepreneur to 
undertake higher effort and also on the region of financial access. 
 
 
6. Policy implications 
 
It is well known that one of the explanations of the low use by Islamic banks of the sharing 
modes of finance relatively to “mark-up” modes is the difficulty to deal with the agency 
problems (moral hazard and adverse selection) (Siddiqui, 2006). According to Ul Haque and 
Mirakhor (1987, p161) “bankers ascribe the problem of moral hazard or asymmetric 
information to be an important explanation for individual preference for short-term liquidity.” 
This problem is even deepen is countries suffering from weak legal systems and higher cost of 
contract enforcement. The results obtained in the context of one-period financial relationship 
(section 3) show that it is possible to extend the use of the sharing contract by widening the 
financial access to the entrepreneurs through two policies or a mix of them. The first policy 
consists in subsidizing the cost of higher effort. The higher effort should be interpreted 
broadly and could reflect the use of a modern technology by the entrepreneur which 
necessitates additional expenses and learning process. A special governmental fund 
subsidizing the adoption of the higher effort by the entrepreneurs endowed with low internal 
resources (SMEs) could be one of the tools to implement this policy. Figure 12 illustrates the 
effect of this policy which reduces the minimum internal resources required for the 
entrepreneur to access to external financing. These minimum resources decreases from 
1 x  to 1 sx . Figure 13 illustrates the effect of the second policy which consists in 
reducing the opportunity cost of the financier which equals the risk-free rate of return  . The 
reduction of the risk-free rate could be done through higher taxation of the financier’s 
revenues generated through “risk-free” financial operations relatively to the revenues 
generated through the “sharing” financial operations. A taxation advantaging the “sharing” 
contract could be justified in terms of reduction of the economic inefficiency which has been 
identified in the context of debt contract and two-periods. Figure 13 illustrates the effect of 
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taxation on the additional benefit of higher effort. The tax’s effect has been chosen (for 
explanation reason) to generate the same effect decreasing the minimum resources required for 
financial access from 1 x  to 1 sx . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Effect of subsidizing the cost of higher effort 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Effect of reducing the risk‐free rate of return (through taxation for example) 
sx  
( )h lc s c 
1 sx  
0x  
Additional benefit 
  *(1 ) (1 )h l            
  h l    
0  1  
Additional cost 
h lc c  
x  
01 x  
1  1 x  0  
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0x  
Additional benefit 
  *(1 ) (1 )h l              h l    
0  1  
Additional cost 
h lc c  
x  
01 x  
1  1 x  0  
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A policy-mix consisting in a combination of taxation of the “risk-free” financial operations 
and subsidizing of the “higher effort” has the advantage to reduce the amplitude of the 
adjustment made through each policy. As illustrated in figure 14, a combination of lower 
subvention of the higher effort compared to figure 12 and lower taxation compared to figure 
13 generates the same effect (relatively to individual policy) on the enlargement of the region 
of financial access. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Effect of a mix‐policy of subsidizing and taxation 
 
The results obtained in the context of two-period financial relationship (section 4) show that it 
is possible to enlarge the region of financial access (through the sharing and debt contracts) 
through the longer horizon of financial relationship from one period to two periods. It has also 
been shown that for the larger horizon to have a positive impact, the entrepreneurs need to be 
sufficiently foresighted. In this context, a governmental agency that accompanies the 
entrepreneurs with low financial resources, by providing them with economic incentives on a 
larger horizon is expected to have a positive externality on the financier-entrepreneur 
relationship under the sharing and debt contracts. 
 
7. Extension 
 
In addition to their ex-post economic inefficiency debt contracts are characterized by the fact 
that all the outcome of the project is transferred to the financier in case of bad performance 
( )  even  if the entrepreneur has undertook the higher effort (see figure 4). While the debt 
contract is more beneficial than the profit sharing contract in case of high payoff of the 
project. 
 
sx  
1 sx  
0x  
Additional benefit 
  *(1 ) (1 )h l              h l    
0  1  
Additional cost 
h lc c  
x  
01 x  
1  1 x  0  
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Figure 15. Comparison of the payoffs for the two types of contracts 
 
It is clear that from the perspective of the risk neutral entrepreneur, the debt contract is ex-ante 
preferable to the profit sharing contract for two reasons. The first one is due to the fact that the 
risk neutral entrepreneur maximizes its expected wealth. The second reason is the fact that for 
the debt contract, earning of the high payoff is more likely than earning of the lower payoff 
(the probability h  is superior to the probability 1 h ). The situation is symmetric for the 
sharing contract. The ex-post analysis is different, since an entrepreneur who has undertaken 
the higher effort but whose project failed prefer to obtain a proportion of the payoff rather than 
having nothing to earn. The ex-ante analysis will be different in case of a risk-averse 
entrepreneur whose utility decreases with the volatility of the revenues. In this case, the 
tradeoff between increasing the expected revenue and reducing the volatility of the revenue 
will favor the sharing contract when the risk aversion exceeds a given threshold.  An extension 
of the present model would be to analyze the Pareto optimality of the sharing contract 
relatively to the debt contract in the context of two-periods, a risk-neutral financier and risk-
averse entrepreneur.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The objective of this paper is to compare sharing (equity) and debt contracts in presence of 
moral hazard which manifests as the hidden effort undertaken by the entrepreneur. The 
originality of this paper relatively to the existing studies consists in performing the comparison 
between the two types of contracts while considering a more general context along two 
dimensions. The first dimension is enabling the internal funds provided by the entrepreneur to 
vary between null (which corresponds to Innes, 1990 and the other above mentioned studies) 
  
0  
Payoff of   
the financier 
    
0x FZ
  
  
* 
*   
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and a level just inferior to 100%.  The second dimension is the incorporation of an incentive 
mechanism to the sharing (equity) contract in the context of a two-period relationship. The 
incentive mechanism is related to the fact that the entrepreneur’s (financier’) share in the 
project’s payoff is increasing (decreasing) with the internal funds.  
 
I showed that the sharing and debt contracts are feasible when the internal funds of the 
entrepreneur are superior to determined thresholds. These thresholds depend on the 
characteristics of the project (size, payoffs, and probability of success/failure) and the 
opportunity cost of the financier. The debt contract is shown to be characterized by larger 
financial access than the sharing contract.  I have also shown that the enlargement of the 
financial-relationship to two periods has an incentivizing effect on the entrepreneur and 
enlarges the region of financial access for the two types of contracts, if a common condition of 
sufficiently foresighted entrepreneur is satisfied. However, two distinct conditions are also 
necessary for the enlargement of the financial access to occur. For the sharing contract, the 
second condition is related to the size of the project which should be inferior to a determined 
threshold. For the debt contract, the second condition is related to the threat of non-renewal of 
the financing in case of first-period failure, which should be sufficiently stringent. In addition, 
it has been shown that the more restrictive the threat of non-renewal the larger the region of 
financial access. However, this is realized at the expense of the second period investment 
which decreases, and represents the economic efficiency’ effect of the debt contract. In the 
policy recommendation section, I discussed the effect of taxing the “risk-free” financial 
operation and subsidizing the “higher effort” of the insufficiently-capitalized entrepreneurs on 
the enlargement of the financial access.   
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
 
The entrepreneur undertakes the lower level of effort after signing the contract if this increases his 
utility. This is the case if the following condition holds 
   * *E(W ) 1  +(1- ) 1 E(W *)ent entl l lc           (A1) 
Using (7) condition (A1) becomes 
  * *( ) (1 ) (1 )h l h lc c               (A2) 
Injecting the expression (6) of *  in (A2) and noting that * x   
  * *
( )h l
h l
c c       
    
  
    * *
( )h l
h l
c c       
    
 (A3) 
Let’s show that * *    . For that assume that * *     and let’s show that this is not possible. 
Multiplying the two members of this inequality by h  and adding *(1- )h    we 
obtain * * *(1 )h h          . Recalling that equation (5) gives * * +(1 ) (1 )h h xF          we 
obtain that *(1 )xF    which becomes (1 )F    since * x  . This is clearly in 
contradiction with the assumption that F  . Therefore, we can now return to (A3) to obtain 
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 
 
 * *( ) 1h l hh l
h l h
E E c c E F
x  
       
              
or
 
equivalently
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
  
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                           
  1 ( )
h l
h l
h
h l
E E c c
x x
F
     
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
i) From Lemma 1 we know that if (1 ) (1 )x x    then the entrepreneur will undertake the higher effort. 
In this case, the entrepreneur’s expected rate of return is identical to the case of symmetric information 
and equals  . 
ii-1) From Lemma 1 we know that if (1 ) (1 )x x    then the entrepreneur chooses the lower effort if 
he is offered the partnership contract * *( , , , )e h xF   . The expected rate of return of the financier is 
determined by the following equation 
* *E(W )  +(1- ) (1 )inv l l x F           (A4) 
Which gives us using (6) 
 * *h lxF             (A5) 
ii-2) For the expected rate of return of the financier to equal   although the entrepreneur chooses the 
lower effort we should have the following equation 
*ˆ ˆE(W )  +(1- ) (1 )inv l l x F         (A6) 
Recalling equation (5): 
* *E(W *)  +(1- ) (1 )inv h h xF           
 It is easy to show that  
 ** *ˆ  + h l hh l h
l l l
x             
    (A7) 
From equation (6) we have       * 1 11 h h h l
h h
E F F
x x
           
               
 
Injecting this expression of *  in (A7) we found 
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      
   * *
1ˆ
1 1
1 1
h h l l h
l
l l
F
x
F F
x
           
     
      
              
 
(A8) 
However, we should ensure that ˆ 1   which is the case only if  ˆ 11llx x F
 
      . Since we 
are under the case x x  the possibility for the financier to offer this contract is conditioned by the 
following condition  ˆ,max( , )x x x x . From Lemma 1 we know that if (1 ) (1 )x x    then the 
entrepreneur chooses the lower effort if he is offered the partnership contract * *( , , , )e h xF    since 
we have the inequality (A2) and given that *ˆ   the same inequality (A2) holds for  ˆ  and the 
entrepreneur chooses the lower effort.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
 
The expected utility of the entrepreneur for an effort level  ,e h l is given by 
E(W \ ) ( )ent e ee xFZ c        (A9) 
Therefore, the entrepreneur chooses the higher level of effort if E(W \ ) E(W \ )ent enth l  or 
equivalently if the following condition is realized 
( ) ( )
1
h h l l
h l
h l
xFZ c xFZ c
c cx x
FZ
   
  
    
     

    (A10) 
Let’s note that x
FZ FZ
   . Hence, the financier’s expected payoff is given by  
W     if   
E(W ) (1 )    if  
(1 )     if  
inv
inv
h h
l l
xFZ x
FZ
xFZ x x
FZ
xFZ x x
FZ

  
  
          


 
The risk-neutral financier is willing to finance the firm if and only if the expected payoff equals 
(1 )xF the payment he obtains from a risk-free investment. This gives us the following condition 
on Z 
 
(1 )                        if   
(1 ) (1 )    if  
(1 ) (1 )     if  
h h
l l
xFZ xF x
FZ
xFZ xF x x
FZ
xFZ xF x x
FZ

   
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               


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1                                    if  
(1 ) (1 )         if  
(1 ) (1 ) >     if  
e
h
h
h
l
l h
l
Z Z x
FZ
xFZ Z x x
xF FZ
xFZ Z Z x x
xF FZ

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
   

                


 
 
Since the two last expressions of Z include x  we should incorporate them in the bounds of the 
intervals in order to determine the latters. Using the expression of x  given by (A10) the inequalities 
/ hFZ x x     are equivalent to  
(1 ) (1 )
h h l
h
h l
h
c cE
x x
F F
   
 
    
    (A11)
Similarly, the inequalities /x x FZ   are equivalent to  
'
(1 ) (1 )
l h l
l l
h l
l l
c cE
Ex x x
F F


  
 
      
    (A12)
We have h lx x  since h l h lE E c c     but 'h lx x  if and only if  2
h l
h
h l
c c    
  
 
Therefore, we have the following cases 
 
 If 0,
(1 )
x
F


    
 then the feasible contract is ( , (1 ) )xF xF . 
 If ,
(1 ) l
x x
F


   
then the feasible contract is ( , )hxF Z xF . 
 If ',min( , )l h lx x x x   then there are two feasible contracts ( , )hxF Z xF and ( , )lxF Z xF . 
 If ' 'min( , ),h l lx x x x    then the feasible contract is ( , )lxF Z xF . 
 If ' ', max( , )l h lx x x x   then the feasible contract is ( , )hxF Z xF . 
 'max( , ),1h lx x x   then there is no feasible contract. 
 
A simple algebra shows that the entrepreneur prefers the contract ( , )hxF Z xF  with higher effort over 
the contract ( , )lxF Z xF  with lower effort when the two are feasible. Finally, the expressions of the 
parameters are summarized in the following: 
 
 
      '( ) / ( ) ( ) / ( ),  ,  
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
l l h
l h l h l h h l h l
l l h
E c c E E c cx x x
F F F
       
  
           
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        0 0
0 0
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )>(1 )  and  > h lh l h
h l
x F x FZ Z Z
x F x F
      
       
 
(A13) 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 
Before proving the results we need the following intermediary result which is easy to show using the 
equations (8) and (10). 
 
Lemma2.  
   if 
ˆax( , )
ˆ   if    
x F F
m x x
x F F
   with  
 
1
1
1
l l
h
F
A
 
   
                
  and   / ( )h l h lA c c    
 
(A14) 
i) For the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort during the first period,  
1 2 1 2E(W \ , ) E(W \ , )
ent ente h e e l e    (A15) 
with
      2 2 21 2 2 1 1E(W \ , ) 1 \ 1 (1 )ent h e e ee h e c E e h E x c                (A16) 
     2 2 21 2 2 1 1E(W \ , ) 1 \ 1 (1 )ent l e e ee l e c E e l E x c                (A17) 
For the entrepreneur to choose the higher effort during the first period we have to obtain  
Using (A16) and (A17) the condition (A15) becomes 
 
 
2 2 1 2 1
(1 \ ) (1 \ )h l ec c E e h E e l            (A18) 
(A17) signifies that the additional effort cost should be more than compensated by the increase in the 
expected discounted wealth. From equation (22) we have 
      1 02 1 2 1 1 1(1 \ ) (1 \ ) (1 ) (1 )h l h
h
x
E e h E e l F
F
         
           
   
Injecting the last equation in (A17) we obtain 
 
     
     
2
2
1 0
1 0
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
 (1 ) (1 ) 1 1
h l
e h
h l h
eh l
h
h l h
xc c F
F
c c F x
F
       
        
      
         


 
  2 0 1 (1 ) (1 )eh l h
h l h
c c F x
F
          
       

 
 32 
 
According to (20) we have 1 0
(1 ) (1 )h
h
Fx     
      

. Therefore (A16) is also equivalent to  
 2 0(1 ) (1 ) (1 )eh l h
h l h h
c c FF x
F
         
           
 
We consider that the incentive for the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort during the second 
period holds ( 2e h ) therefore we obtain 
 0
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
h l
h l
h h
c c
F Fx
F
        

           
 
which becomes 
 0x x x x x   

  (A19) 
with x  given by (8) and the rest of the variables are 
 
(1 )
hx x
F
  
 
    (A20) 
 (1 ) (1 )h
F
F
        (A21) 
Therefore, the partnership contract over two periods enlarges the region of financial access 
if ˆax( , )x m x x . Using lemma 2 this is equivalent to the following conditions  
   if 
ˆ   if    
x x F F
x x F F
   

 
 
 
   if 
ˆ   if    
x x x x F F
x x x x F F




        

 
             if   
ˆ
   if      
F F
x x
F F
x x
 
 
      

  (A22) 
Using (A20) and (10) it is easy to show that ˆ 0x x   is possible if and only if  
 
 
1 1/
1
hh l
h l h
F F
   
     
       (A23) 
Therefore (A22) becomes 
             if   
    if   max( , )  
ˆ
F F
x x
F F F F
x x
 
 
       

  (A24) 
 
ii) Now, for the entrepreneur to choose the higher effort during the second period we have to ensure 
that the following condition holds: 
2 1 2 2 1 2( , ) ( , )
ent entW e h e h W e h e l      (A25) 
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         
     
  
2 1 2 1
2 1
1 2
1 1 (1 ) 1 1 1
1 1
h h h l h l l
h l h l
h l h l
x c x c
x c c
x c c
         
    
      
          
       
     



 
Let’s recall that equation (21) gives us  
2 1
(1 )
h
Fx    
     

 
Therefore (A24) becomes  
1
1
(1 )             
(1 )
h l
h h l
h l
h l h
c cFx
c c Fx
     
     
        
         
 
Or equivalently  1 h lx x x     where 1x  is defined by (17) and (20) and given by 
 
0 0
1
0
1 (1 )     with prob 
1                                   with prob 1
h
h
h
x x
F Fx
x
F
  
 
           
 
 
Therefore the condition for the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort at the second period 
(whatever the state of the nature that occurs at the end of the first period) is the following 
01 xx
F
   or equivalently   0 ' 1 h lFx x x      
Let’s now note that ' 1x   if and only if      (1 ) (1 )
h l
h h l
h l
E E c c
F F  
 
   
        
In other words if F F then the entrepreneur undertakes the higher effort uncondionally. However, if 
F F then the entrepreneur undertakes the higher effort only if 0 'x x . Finally, the different 
thresholds presented in proposition 3 are summarized in the following: 
 (1 ) (1 )h
F
F
      

 
; 1x x x  
     
 
  ;   
(1 )
hx
F
  
 
    
  
1
1
1 / ( )
l l
h h l h l
F
c c
 
     
                    
 
 
1 1/
1
hh l
h l h
F
   
     
      
(A26) 
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Proof of Proposition 4 
 
Before proving the results of this proposition we need the following intermediary result.  
 
Lemma3.  
 
'
'
   if  
max( , )
    if   
h h l
h l
l h l
x c c c
x x
x c c c
      
  
i) The expected wealth of the financier in each period should equal the wealth he would obtain if he 
invests his capital in a risk-free asset. At the end of the first period he obtains: 
Whereas at the end of the second period he obtains 
Therefore,  
1 11 1 0 1 0
E(W \ , )  +(1- ) (1 )inv e ee h l x FZ x F        (A30)
2 22 2 1 2 1
E(W \ , )  +(1- ) (1 )inv e ee h l x FZ x F        (A31)
From (A30) and (A31) we can easily derive the following expressions: 
 
11 0
 ( ) eZ Z x and 22 1 ( ) eZ Z x  (A32)
where , ( )e h lZ x is given by (A13).  
 
The expected utility of the entrepreneur over the two periods is given by 
    1 1 1 2 21 2 1 2E(W \ , ) 1ent e e e e ee e c p x FZ c                 (A33)
For the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort during the first period we have to obtain  
1 2 1 2E(W \ , ) E(W \ , )
ent ente h e e l e    (A34)
Where the two terms of the inequality are obtained from (A33) for 1e h  and 1e l  respectively 
   
2 21 2 1 2
E(W \ , ) 1ent h h h e ee h e c p x FZ c                  (A35)
where  2( ) /h l hc         (A27)
1
1
0 1
1 0
  with a probability of 
W min( , )
     with a probability of 1-
einv
e
x FZ
x FZ
  
  

 (A28)
2
2
1 2
2 1 2
  with a probability of 
W min( , )
     with a probability of 1-
einv
e
x FZ
x FZ
  
  

 (A29)
 35 
 
   
2 21 2 1 2
E(W \ , ) 1ent l l l e ee l e c p x FZ c                  (A36)
Using (A35) and (A36) the condition (A34) becomes 
      2 21 21h l h l e ec c p x FZ c           (A37)
which signifies that in order for the entrepreneur to undertake the higher effort during the first period, 
the additional effort cost should be more than compensated by the increase in the expected discounted 
wealth. 
   2 2 1 21 h l h e eh l
c c c x FZ
p
    
       
Since we
 
have from (A31) 
2 21 2 1
 (1 ) (1 )e ex FZ x F          then the condition (A37) becomes  
  
 
2 2
2 2
1
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1
                                  (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
h l
h e e
h l
e e
c c c x F F F
p
F x F
        
     
           
       
 
 
But we have also 1 0 1(1 )x F x FZ   . Therefore, we obtain 
    2 2 0 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )1 h l h e eh l
c c c x FZ F
p
        
            
    2 2 0 1
(1 )(1 ) (1 )
1
h l
h e e h h
hh l
c c c x FZ F
p
         
           (A38)
We have also from (A30):  0 1 0 =(1 ) (1 )h hx FZ x F       which injected in (A38) gives us   
    
    
2 2
2 2
0
2
0
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1
(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1
h l
h e e h h
hh l
h l
h e e h h
h hh l
c c c x F F
p
c c c x F F
p
           
            
            
                  
 
  2
2
0
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1
e h h l
h
h h h l
c cx F E E F c
p 
      
              
  20
1
(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
e hh h h l
h h
h l
c cx E E F c
F p 
      
                           
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
 
 
   20 2 1(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) h l ehh hh l
c c
x x E c F
F p 
     
                    
0 2
1 1( , )
(1 ) (1 )
h h l
h
h l
c cx x p x
F p
    
               
where
 
 
(A39) 
 2
1
(1 ) (1 )eh l h
h l
E c F
c c 
    
        
(A40) 
 
Therefore, the debt contract over two periods enlarges the region of financial access 
if '( ) max( , )h lx x x  . Using lemma 3 it is easy to show that this is equivalent to the following 
conditions  
 
'
( , )    if   
( , )     if   
h h l
l h l
x p x c c c
x p x c c c


       
  
 
 
  p p
 
with 
 
 
1                                                   if   
  
11     if   
1 (1 ) 1 / ( )
h l
h l
h l
c c c
p
c c c
c c c



  
              
 
(A41) 
 
 
(A42) 
 
 
(A43) 
 
From (A39) it is easy to note that  
 
( , )
0
( , )
0
x p
x p
p



 
 
 
 
From (A43) we have also  
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0
( )
0
h l
p
c c
p

  
 
 
 
ii) Now, for the entrepreneur to choose the higher effort during the second period we have to ensure 
that the following condition holds: 
2 1 2 2 1 2( , ) ( , )
ent entW e h e h W e h e l      (A44) 
Where the two terms of the inequality can be obtained from (A35) by using 2e h  and 2e l  
respectively. By doing this (A44) becomes 
 
   1 2 1 2h h l lx FZ c x FZ c       
   1 2h l h lc c x FZ       (A45) 
Let’s note that  
 
        2 21 2 1 21h l e e h lp x FZ c x FZ               
 
Therefore, if condition (A37) holds the condition (A45) will be satisfied consequently. In other words, 
the condition that ensures that the entrepreneur undertakes the high effort during the first period 
ensures also that he has no incentive to shirk during the second period. Consequently, we can replace 
2e  by h  in (A41).  
